













An Analysis of the Determinants of Voluntary Impairment 















The global economic recession has presented Irish and UK companies with 
considerable business challenges, thereby increasing the likelihood that these firms 
face reduced cash-flow forecasts and impaired asset values. Voluntary impairment 
disclosures are therefore expected to be of particular interest to the users of the 2009 
financial statements.  
 
This cross-sectional study investigates the relationship between twelve hypothesised 
factors and the level of voluntary impairment disclosures made by UK and Irish 
companies. In order to conduct this research, content analysis and statistical 
regression techniques are applied in line with established practices in the empirical 
disclosure literature. 
 
The mean voluntary disclosure score of 26% observed in this study suggests that UK 
and Irish firms are providing additional information to shareholders beyond the 
requirements of IAS 36 Impairment of Assets.   
 
The results of the statistical analysis provide substantial evidence for the agency and 
signalling theories of disclosure. Firms with increased impairments, leverage and 
profits are found to have a significantly positive relationship with voluntary 
impairment disclosures. This suggests that voluntary impairment disclosure acts as an 
important control mechanism to mitigate the risk of agency problems. In addition, no 














This paper considers the determinants of voluntary disclosure practices in the 
accounting for impairments under IAS 36 by UK and Irish listed companies.  
 
Throughout the sample period for this study (companies with year ends in the 
calendar year 2009), the global economic recession presented Irish and UK companies 
with considerable business challenges (ISE, 2010, p.33). This background of weak 
economic activity and market uncertainty increases the likelihood that companies face 
reduced cash-flow forecasts and impaired asset values (PwC, 2008). Echoing this 
conclusion, IAASA considers asset impairment to be a key issue in the 2009 financial 
statements of Irish companies (Curtis, 2010). This period of economic uncertainty in 
the UK and Ireland provides the first opportunity to explore the reasons behind the 
extent of voluntary impairment disclosure, in an international context, since the 
introduction of IFRS in 2005. 
 
There is a significant body of research on corporate disclosures. Beattie (2005) noted 
that 23% of the output of UK financial accounting research published between 1998 
and 2002 could be categorised under the broad heading of „corporate disclosure 
studies‟. However, according to Hodgson et al (2009), disclosures relating to IAS 36 
Impairment of Assets have not been previously examined in the literature.  
 
The current study employs a content analysis approach. Following the approach of 
Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) an un-weighted, dichotomous disclosure index is 
developed. The disclosure index provides the dependent variable. Prior research and 
theoretical constructs assist in the identification of independent variables. Ordinary 
least square (OLS) regression is the primary statistical technique used to test for the 
existence of any relationship between the dependent variable and the hypothesised 
independent variables.   
 
Our main research questions are: 
 What is the extent of voluntary impairment disclosures in the annual reports of 
UK and Irish companies? 
 What are the factors that influence the level of voluntary impairment 
disclosures made by UK and Irish companies? 
 
This study contributes to the substantial body of research on corporate disclosures, 
showing that UK and Irish firms do provide additional impairment information to 
stakeholders and by investigating the factors that contribute to this behaviour.  
 
We found that while the average impairment size was unexpectedly small (median 
amount of £6.0m, n = 100), a mean voluntary disclosure score of 26% was observed. 
This voluntary disclosure score is based on a researcher-constructed disclosure index 
which is recognised as inherently subjective. However, to ensure rigour, previous 
empirical studies informed its development (Owusu-Ansah (1997), Cooke (1993) and 
Krippendorff (2003), for example). 
 





We hypothesize that twelve factors could influence the level of voluntary disclosure. 
Our research shows that the impairment amount, the level of profits, leverage, US 
dual listing and the impairment type (goodwill or other) were all significant factors in 
determining the level of voluntary disclosure. As hypothesized, there was no 
significant difference between the Irish listed and UK listed companies. Finally, no 
significance was found for the variables representing the level of export sales, size, 
corporate code compliance, sector, independent non executive directors and 
independent audit committee. In all cases, for the significant factors, the direction of 
the relationship was positive, as originally hypothesized.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section two considers the 
previous literature and theoretical basis of the paper, this leads to the development of 
the proposed hypotheses. In section three, the research methodology is detailed and 
the key methodological decisions are explained. The results of the empirical research 
are set out in section four, while, section five is the discussion and conclusion.  
 
 
2.0: Previous Literature 
 
This section will briefly consider IAS 36 Impairment of Assets (IASB, 2009). It will 
provide the reader with sufficient detail to appreciate the context of the study but will 
not be an in-depth analysis of its provisions. Then the theoretical background to the 
motivations behind voluntary disclosures will be discussed. This will form the basis 
for developing hypotheses that will be tested in later sections. 
 
 
2.1:  IAS 36: Impairment of Assets 
 
The motivation for this paper is IAS 36 Impairment of Assets (IASB, 2009). UK and 
Irish companies had significant discretion determining the amount and timing of 
impairments until the introduction of FRS 11 Impairment of Fixed Assets and 
Goodwill in 1998 (Lin and Peasnell, 2000). IAS 36 Impairment of Assets was 
developed concurrently, with both standards sharing broadly similar requirements and 
disclosures (Curtis, 2010 and McDonnell, 2005). IAS 36 became a mandatory 
standard for listed UK and Irish firms upon conversion to IFRS in 2005. The standard 
underwent some minor amendments in 2008 and 2009 as part of the IASB annual 
„Improvements to IFRS‟s‟ project (Deloitte, 2010). 
 
IAS 36 Impairment of Assets (IASB, 2009) applies to all assets but there are a number 
of notable exceptions. Financial assets are not subject to IAS 36 Impairment of 
Assets, instead the provisions of IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and 
Measurement apply (IAS 36.2e). In the context of the current study this is an 
important exception. The sample period of the study (the annual reports of companies 
with a year end in the calendar year 2009) was a difficult time for many companies, in 
particular, those in the banking sector. However, the disclosures that companies made 
in relation to their write downs on financial assets (impaired loans in the banking 
sector, for example) do not form part of this study. Other assets that are excluded 
from IAS 36 are inventories (IAS 36.2a), assets arising from construction contracts 
(IAS 36.2b), deferred tax assets (IAS 36.2c) among others.    
 





Impairment losses are determined by estimating the amount by which an asset‟s 
balance sheet value exceeds its recoverable amount (IAS 36.6). The recoverable 
amount is calculated as the higher of asset‟s value in use and fair value less costs to 
sell. Impairment testing must be conducted when there is an indication that 
impairment may have occurred (IAS 36.9) and annually in the case of goodwill (IAS 
36.10).   
 
Recognition of an impairment loss on the face of the income statement depends on 
whether assets are measured under the cost or revaluation model (IAS 16.30:31). 
Under the cost model, impairment is the difference between the carrying value and 
recoverable amount and is charged to the income statement. Impairment losses on re-
valued assets are allocated between the Income Statement and Other Comprehensive 
Income (IAS 36.60). Impairment of prior revaluation gains is treated first as a 
revaluation decrease with the remainder recorded in the Income Statement. 
 
The minimum disclosures are set out in paragraphs 126 to 137 of IAS 36 Impairment 
of Assets (IASB, 2009). The motivation behind these extensive disclosures was to 
help users in assessing the reliability of the amounts included in the financial 
statements (IAS 36, BC200). As a consequence, entities are expected to provide 
information on the methodology used and the estimates employed to arrive at the 
impairment amount for its cash generating units (IAS 36, 126:137). 
 
 
2.2: Previous Empirical Impairment Research  
 
Previous impairment research has focused chiefly on earnings management and value 
relevance studies. This research has found that impairments have increased in 
magnitude and frequency over the past twenty years (Reidl, 2004). The associated 
write-downs have the potential to substantially impact the financial statements, 
providing incentives for opportunistic reporting (Alciatore et al., 1998). These 
incentives are particularly evident for goodwill impairment and restructuring charges 
(Francis et al, 1996; Schilit, 2002).  
 
Several studies have found evidence of once-off „big bath‟ impairments, adding to 
already poor earnings in order to reduce future reported costs (Zucca and Campbell, 
1992; Reidl, 2004) or postponing impairments in order to smooth earnings (Hilton 
and O'Brien, 2009). However, most studies indicate that managers are appropriately 
responding to declining asset values (Alciatore et al., 1998). 
 
Impairment value relevance studies form part of the vast capital markets accounting 
research initiated by Ball and Brown (1968). Impairments have consistently shown a 
negative relationship to share prices (Alciatore et al., 1998; Barth and Clinch, 1998). 
In a recent study of goodwill impairment, Lapointe-Antunes et al., (2009) find a 
similar relationship despite evidence of significant managerial bias. In light of such 
discretion, it is not surprising that voluntary disclosures are considered to provide new 
and relevant information to shareholders (Healy and Palepu, 2001) with explanatory 
narrative disclosures growing in importance (Beattie et al., 2004). Echoing the 
conclusions of Gray and Skogsvik (2004), these studies highlight that shareholder 
uncertainty arising from opportunistic reporting and varied valuation practice can 
potentially be mitigated through the use of voluntary disclosures. 







2.3: Influences on Disclosure Practices 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed a theory of the ownership structure of the firm. 
Their theory had implications for the voluntary disclosure of information by 
management to creditors and shareholders. They highlighted the extent of agency 
costs and the incentives for contracting parties to minimize those costs. The problem 
of agency and the related issue of information asymmetry have been extensively 
studied in the literature (Arrow 1963, Arrow 1985, Healy and Palepu 2001). These 
problems are exacerbated by the degree of ownership dispersion (Barako et al., 2006) 
and complexity of the firm‟s transactions and operations (Cerbioni and Parbonetti, 
2007). In the context of the current study, in order to reduce the asymmetry, investors 
require reliable performance information to be disclosed at regular intervals, often 
taking the form of financial reporting statements (Marshall and Weetman, 2002).  
 
A free-market perspective on accounting disclosures assumes that demand and supply 
forces will determine the optimal disclosure quantity without the need for regulation 
(Watts, 1977). However, unlike most goods which are considered „rivalrous‟ or 
exclusive to the purchaser (Eaton et al., 2005, p.617), accounting disclosures can be 
viewed as public goods since potential investors, as „free-riders‟, can avail of 
disclosures paid for by current shareholders (Bromwich, 1992, p.245).  This „free-
rider‟ externality problem results in the underproduction of disclosures (Pindyck and 
Rubinfield, 2001, p.623) requiring the introduction of mandatory disclosures to 
correct the market failure (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007).  
 
Mandatory disclosure rules prescribe the minimum information requirements ensuring 
equal access to all users (Bujaki and McConomy, 2002). However, firms still provide 
additional voluntary disclosures despite the rising level of mandatory requirements 
(Healy and Palepu, 1995; Watson et al., 2002), highlighting the continued existence 
of information asymmetries in a regulated disclosure market. Demand for voluntary 
disclosure depends upon mandatory disclosure requirements (Einhorn, 2005), with 
both considered necessary for the smooth functioning of capital markets (Rogers, 
2008). 
 
According to Healy and Palepu (1995), the manager‟s voluntary disclosure decision 
consists of weighing the potential benefits and costs of disclosure and determining the 
optimal outcome depending on the specific characteristics of the firm and its 
environment. However, other factors may determine the level of voluntary disclosure, 
which are not captured through the cost-benefit analysis approach (Arcay and 
Vazquez, 2005). 
 
Healy and Palepu (2001) also note that even in an efficient capital market, managers 
have superior information. In a world of imperfect accounting regulation, managers 
are faced with a disclosure decision: 
– provide additional information  
o to reduce the cost of external finance (Myers and Majluf, 1984)  
o to prevent undervaluation of the firm & to explain poor 
performance (DeAngelo 1988) or to prevent undervaluation of 
stock compensation plans (Aboody and Kasznik, 2000) 





o to manage investor perceptions of management, according to 
Trueman (1986) managers provide additional information (via 
earnings forecasts) to permit a more favourable assessment by 
investors of management‟s ability. This theory is unproven (Healy 
and Palepu, 2001).  
– provide less information 
o to minimise litigation costs (should the additional information 
provided prove to be misleading) as proposed by Frankel et al 
(1995). 
o to protect competitive position in product markets, however, 
according to Healy and Palepu (2001) there is little direct evidence 
on this phenomenon.  
 
Much of the research in this field is quantitative, however, the results of a small 
number of qualitative studies have been reported. In their interviews of corporate 
executives, Armitage and Marston (2008) find that managers provide voluntary 
disclosures in order to obtain the financial benefits associated with a reduction in 
information asymmetries. However, managers also recognise that a reputation for 
transparency and openness is not without cost (ibid). In a more wide ranging report on 
corporate financial communications, Holland (2006) deduced that entities with high 
disclosure quality reputations along with good track records and high quality 
management were „likely‟ to have a cumulative effect in reducing the equity cost of 
capital. The Holland (2006) study was based largely on 25 interviews of finance 
directors of companies within the FTSE 350 (22 of whom were in the FTSE 100). 
These findings do highlight a degree of consistency with numerous studies using 
different research paradigms; for example, Myers and Majluf (1984), Lambert et al 
(2007) and Diamond and Verrecchia (1991). 
 
 
2.4: Hypothesis Development  
 
There have been numerous empirical studies that have considered the determinants of 
voluntary disclosure. These studies will inform our study and permit us to develop a 
number of hypotheses that will be subsequently tested in the context of IAS 36.  
 
 
2.4.1 Firm Size 
 
Multiple theories link firm size and voluntary disclosure. Agency theory proposes that 
agency costs arise on separation of ownership and management and these costs are 
likely to be higher in larger companies due to wider dispersion of ownership (Hossain 
and Hammami, 2009). Similarly, larger firms are likely to have more complex 
operations and in order to reduce information asymmetries and related agency costs 
such firms will increase impairment disclosure. Larger firms are also more likely to 
attract media and government attention and may volunteer information to avoid 
political costs and legitimise their dominance (Leventis and Weetman, 2004). 
   
Proprietary costs are expected to be smaller for large firms, since they are less likely 
to face competitive disadvantages from increased disclosure and they also benefit 
from superior information systems thereby reducing the dissemination costs of 





disclosure (Ali et al., 2004). In addition, larger firms need proportionately more funds 
from capital markets and may volunteer impairment disclosures in order to reduce 
their cost of capital (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008).   
 
 
Although numerous prior studies find a positive relationship between size and 
voluntary disclosure (Table 1), its theoretical significance is questionable since it 
reflects a variety of influences (Ball and Foster, 1982). Nevertheless, size is viewed as 
a valuable proxy for omitted variables and should be included (Watson et al., 2002).   
 
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between firm size and 





Agency theory proposes that firms with higher debt face higher agency costs since 
creditors attempt to restrict management actions through the use of covenants and 
increased monitoring activities (Watson et al., 2002). This suggests that management 
have an incentive to reduce the level of scrutiny by producing information voluntarily.  
 
Signalling theory provides competing explanations for voluntary disclosure. A highly-
leveraged firm may be less willing to volunteer impairment information for fear of 
signalling increased risk of default. However, given the extent of mandatory 
disclosures in place, managers may alternatively disclose voluntarily to signal their 




Prior studies produce conflicting results (Table 2) although a majority find that firms 
with higher debt volunteer more to meet the information demands of creditors.  
Study Subject Location Relationship 
Linsley and Shrives (2006) Risk UK None 
Eng and Mak (2003) General Singapore Negative 
Bujaki and McConomy (2002) Governance Canada Positive 
Ferguson et al., (2002) General Hong Kong Positive 
Hossain et al.,(1995) General New Zealand Positive 
Meek et al., (1995) General Multinational Negative 
 
Table 2: Past Studies: Voluntary Disclosure and Leverage Variable 
Study Subject Location Relationship 
Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) General Ireland Positive 
Wang et al., (2008) General  China Positive 
Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) Fin. Instruments Portugal Positive 
Bassett et al., (2007) Share Options Australia Positive 
Watson et al., (2002) Ratios UK Positive 
Depoers (2000) General  France Positive 
 
Table 1: Past Studies: Voluntary Disclosure and Size Variable 






Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between leverage and 





Industries have different risks and characteristics which may result in varying levels 
of disclosure. The proprietary costs of disclosure are likely to be linked to competition 
intensity within the industry and institutional theory suggests that voluntary disclosure 
is associated with industry bandwagon effects. Companies operating in highly 
regulated sectors may face larger agency costs and increase disclosure to reduce these 
(Arcay and Vázquez, 2005). Additionally, firms in high-profile industries (e.g. 
financial) may volunteer information in order to legitimise their societal status and 




Although prior results are mixed (Table 3), it is hypothesised that financial firms 
volunteer more impairment disclosure due to the increased public scrutiny these firms 
face in the UK and Ireland in the wake of the 2008 international credit crisis and 
global recession. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between financial firms 





In prior studies (Table 4), managers of more profitable firms are predicted to provide 
additional disclosures in an attempt to ensure shares are not undervalued (signalling 
theory), to justify company profit levels (legitimacy theory) or to improve their 
compensation packages (agency theory) (Garcia-Meca et al., 2005). Alternatively, 
poorer performing firms may disclose more in order to signal management‟s ability to 
provide improved future results (Inchausti, 1997).    
 
Table 3: Past Studies: Voluntary Disclosure and Sector Variable 
Study Subject Location Relationship 
Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) Fin. Instruments Portugal 
financial sector; 
positive 
Leventis and Weetman (2004)  General Greece 
consumer sector; 
positive 
Eng and Mak (2003) General Singapore None 
Watson et al., (2002) Ratios UK Utilities; negative 
Ferguson et al., (2002) General Hong Kong None 
Meek et al., (1995) General Multinational Oil/mining; positive 
 







In the case of impairment disclosures, more profitable (or smaller loss-making) 
companies may disclose more in order to explain environmental contributors to the 
impairment and signal management‟s ability to maximise firm performance despite 
expectations of lower future cash flows.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between profitability 
and the extent of voluntary impairment disclosure. 
 
 
2.4.5 Impairment Size 
 
The extent of the asset impairment is predicted to be an important explanatory factor 
in determining the extent of voluntary disclosure. If impairment amounts are 
insignificant then there may not be an impetus for management to provide additional 
information. However, as the amount of the impairment charge increases, firms may 
face additional monitoring and agency costs, questions concerning management 
competence and increased risk of litigation.   
 
Managers may thereby decide to provide disclosures to signal their stewardship 
abilities, to justify their performance or even their positions. Unscrupulous managers 
may use voluntary disclosures to engage in impression management and attempt to 
attribute the impairments to environmental factors when managerial mismanagement 
is responsible. 
 
Hypothesis 5: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between impairment 
size and the extent of voluntary impairment disclosure. 
 
 
2.4.6 Type of Impairment 
 
IAS 36 covers impairments relating to goodwill, intangible assets and PPE. These 
assets have varying characteristics and market liquidity. Goodwill, for example, is a 
unique asset to each firm since it cannot be traded on active markets. Therefore, 
goodwill impairments are considered to be more subjective and prone to management 
discretion than other impairments (Francis et al., 1996). IAS 36:66 requires that 
goodwill is allocated to the smallest group of assets that independently generates cash 
flows (known as a cash generating unit) for the purpose of impairment testing. The 
complexity involved in this process is likely to result in information asymmetries 
between management and stakeholders and increased agency costs (Cerbioni and 
Study Subject Location Relationship 
Wang et al., (2008) General  China Positive 
Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007)  General Italy Positive 
Gul and Leung (2004)  General Hong Kong Positive 
Walker and Louvari (2003) EPS ratio UK Positive 
Inchausti (1997) General Spain Negative 
 
Table 4: Past Studies: Voluntary Disclosure and Profitability Variable 





Parbonetti, 2007). In order to reduce these costs, managers are therefore incentivised 
to provide voluntary impairment disclosures compared with impairments relating to 
other assets.  
 
Hypothesis 6: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between goodwill 
impairment and the extent of voluntary impairment disclosure. 
 
 
2.4.7 Independent NED's 
 
The role of the board of directors is to monitor management decisions in order to limit 
opportunism and reduce agency risks. Since executive directors are involved in the 
daily operations of the firm, the Combined Code on Corporate Governance (FRC, 
2008, s.A.3.2) recommends that the board of directors contains a majority of 
independent NED‟s in order to improve the board‟s effectiveness.   
 
Since the firm‟s annual report is prepared by the board, it is anticipated that its 
composition affects the extent of voluntary disclosure with a higher proportion of 
independent NED‟s likely to exert greater influence on board disclosure decisions 




Prior studies (Table 5) yield mixed results with some Asian research suggesting a 
substitution effect between the proportion of Independent NED‟s and voluntary 
disclosure. However, since recent European research posits a positive correlation 
between both control mechanisms, this study also hypothesises a complementary 
relationship.   
 
Hypothesis 7: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between the proportion 
of independent non-executive directors on corporate boards and the extent of 
voluntary impairment disclosure. 
 
 
2.4.8 Fully-Independent Audit Committee 
 
The audit committee is recognized as a key monitoring mechanism to reduce agency 
costs and oversee the financial reporting process. In addition, empirical evidence 
suggests that audit committees increase the extent of voluntary disclosure (Arcay and 
Vázquez, 2005). The independence of the committee is considered crucial to its 
Study Subject Location Relationship 
Donnolly and Mulcahy (2008) General Ireland Positive 
Abraham and Cox (2007) Risk UK Positive 
Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007)  General Italy Positive 
Cheng and Courtenay (2006) General Singapore Positive 
Gul  and Leung (2004) General Hong Kong Negative 
Eng and Mak (2003) General Singapore Negative 
 
Table 5: Past Studies: Voluntary Disclosure and Independent NED‟s 





effectiveness, with the 2008 Combined Code on Corporate Governance 
recommending that it consists of at least three independent NEDs with one having 
relevant and recent financial experience (FRC, 2008, s.C.3.1).  
 
Although Bassett et al., (2007) find no relationship between audit committee 
independence and voluntary disclosure for share-options, agency theory suggests that 
a fully independent board volunteers more disclosures than a part-independent one.     
 
Hypothesis 8: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between the existence of 




2.4.9 Combined Code Compliance 
 
Firms listed on the ISEQ and FTSE350 indices must report on the extent to which 
they have complied with the provisions of the Combined Code on Corporate 
Governance (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). Firms may comply fully with the code in 
order to signal increased accountability to shareholders and thereby reduce agency 
costs. Such firms are hypothesised to also volunteer impairment disclosures reflecting 
a policy of transparency.  
 
Hypothesis 9: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between full compliance 
with the combined code and the extent of voluntary impairment disclosure. 
 
 
2.4.10 ISEQ/FTSE Listing 
 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) note that firms‟ disclosure practices are considerably 
influenced by the underlying cultural environment of the countries in which they 
operate. Several international studies find that different economic, legal and political 
systems impact managements‟ disclosure decisions (Ding, 2002; Jaggi and Low, 
2000). However, in the case of Ireland and the UK, both countries are recognised as 
sharing similar cultural attributes (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008).  
 
Ireland and the UK share the same language, common-law tradition and institutional 
environment. In addition, both countries have similarly small levels of family and 
state owned enterprises (c.25%) (Faccio and Lang, 2002) and shared the same 
accounting standards prior to conversion to IFRS in 2005. Although the Irish Stock 
Exchange is considerably smaller than the London market and some cultural 
differences exist, these factors are not considered likely to outweigh the similarities 
between both nations. 
 
Hypothesis 10: Ceteris paribus, there is no difference between ISEQ and FTSE listed 
firms and the extent of voluntary impairment disclosure. 
 
 
2.4.11 US Dual-Listing 
 





The relationship between voluntary impairment disclosure and a listing on a US 
listing is grounded on several theories. US based shareholders may have higher 
information requirements for foreign companies which results in increased monitoring 
and agency costs, thereby incentivising managers to provide additional disclosures 
(Cuijpers and Buijink, 2005). Prior studies have found that US dual-listed firms 
perceive higher litigation risks (Core, 1997) which may further encourage managers 
to disclose. Capital need theory also suggests that dual-listing firms require additional 




Although, in November 2007, the US based SEC decided to remove the requirement 
for foreign US-listed companies using IFRS to reconcile their accounts to US 
accounting standards, it is anticipated that these firms volunteer information 
consistent with the consistent positive relationship found in previous studies (Table 
6).  
 
Hypothesis 11: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between US dual-
listing and the extent of voluntary impairment disclosure. 
 
 
2.4.12 Export Sales 
 
Firms with substantial international interests may provide additional disclosures even 
if they are not internationally listed (Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007). Exports are likely 
to require the use of foreign resources in order to support their operations and firms 
may increase disclosure in order to signal their commitment to sustainable 
partnerships (El-Gazzar et al., 1999). 
 
Exporting firms engage new stakeholders such as foreign customers and governments 
suggesting that such firms volunteer information in order to build confidence 
(Dumontier and Raffournier, 1998). Also, firms with higher exports are more visible 
globally and likely to be monitored by international organisations meaning firms may 
respond with increased disclosures to legitimise their global presence (Owusu-Ansah, 
1998). 
 
Study Subject Location Relationship 
Bassett et al., (2007) Share Options Australia Positive 
Abraham and Cox (2007) Risk UK Positive 
Inchausti (1997) General Spain Positive 
Hossain et al.,(1995) General New Zealand Positive 
 
Table 6: Past Studies: Voluntary Disclosure and US Listing Variable 







Prior studies report a positive association between voluntary disclosure and 
international sales (Table 7) and it is anticipated that voluntary impairment 
disclosures are similarly correlated. 
 
Hypothesis 12: Ceteris paribus, there is a positive association between international 
sales and the extent of voluntary impairment disclosure. 
 
 
3: Research Design 
 
This study has two main research questions: 
 
 What is the extent of voluntary impairment disclosures in the annual reports of 
UK and Irish companies? 
 What are the factors that influence the level of voluntary impairment 
disclosures made by UK and Irish companies? This question has been distilled 
to the twelve hypotheses outlined in section 2.4. 
 
3.1: Research Approach  
 
The research approach adopted in this study is broadly in line with the established 
practice in the disclosure literature. Such research is empirical in nature availing of 
quantitative techniques, primarily the content analysis of secondary data (Beattie and 
Thomson, 2007). For disclosure studies, this involves the construction of a disclosure 
scoring sheet and index which capture the amount and level of detail of voluntary 
disclosure (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). The firm based disclosure score is regarded 
as the dependent variable in univariate and multivariate statistical analyses and is 
compared against a variety of financial characteristics as explanatory variables 
(Chavent, et al., 2006).  
 
3.2: Data Selection and Sources 
 
3.2.1 Sample Selection 
 
This is a multinational study investigating the disclosures of publically listed 
companies in the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. Given the relatively 
small size and thin trading volume of the Irish Stock Exchange (Mc Cluskey et al., 
2006) in comparison to the London Stock Exchange, it was considered appropriate to 
match the respective national indices by market capitalisation range in order to ensure 
relative comparability in scale. Hence, the initial population consisted of firms listed 
Study Subject Location Relationship 
Wang et al., (2008) General  China Positive 
Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007)  General Italy Positive 
Gul and Leung (2004)  General Hong Kong Positive 
Walker and Louvari (2003) EPS ratio UK Positive 
 
Table 7: Past Studies: Voluntary Disclosure and Exports Variable 





on the FTSE 250 index
1
 and the thirty largest firms by market capitalisation on the 
Irish Stock Exchange, including six firms trading on the IEX. Similar sample 
stratification procedures are common in multinational studies (Ding, 2002).  
 
Two firms were excluded from the study due to data unavailability. EnQuest Plc 
demerged from Petrofac Plc on 5 April 2010 (EnQuest Plc, 2010) and has yet to issue 
its first annual report. In addition, comparative performance and market data for 
Dimension Plc was not available from the Thomson OneBanker database, thus it was 
also excluded.  
 
The annual reports for the remaining 278 firms are examined to determine whether 
any applicable asset impairment has been recorded during the financial year ended 
2009. The combined sum of UK and Irish listed firms with impairments totalled 101 
firms which became the final sample size. This sample size is larger than the average 
of 85 firms calculated by Ahmed and Courtis (1999) in their meta-analysis of 29 
previous disclosure studies. Table 8 provides a summary of sample selection. 
 
Finally, when the primary data was collected one company, Heritage Oil, was 
excluded due to outlier effects. For example, its net margin, one of the explanatory 




The industry composition of the sample, following the FTSE General Industry 
Classification System (GICS), is outlined in Table 9. 
 
                                                 
1
 The FTSE 250 index comprises of firms ranked from position 101 to 350 by market capitalisation on 
the London Stock Exchange.  
  UK  Ireland  Total 
Initial Population 250 30 280 
Annual Report Unavailable -1 0 -1 
Comparative Data Unavailable -1 0 -1 
No Impairment -167 -10 -177 
Final Initial Sample 81 20 101 
Outlier 1 0 1 
Final Sample 80 20 100 
 
Table 8: Sample Selection 








3.2.2: Choice of Disclosure Medium  
 
Managers can disclose information through a variety of means beyond the annual 
report including press releases, analyst meetings and website announcements (Patelli 
and Prencipe, 2007). The use and respective importance of such media depends on the 
corporate environment in which these companies operate. In the United States, for 
example, press releases and analyst meetings are considered to be the most important 
means of communication (Eccles and Mavrinac, 1995).  
 
Healy and Palepu (2001) highlight that the predominant use of annual reports in these 
studies may mean that disclosures made through these alternative means are ignored. 
However, prior studies note that disclosures made in the annual report are positively 
correlated with other media, suggesting a coordinated approach to corporate 
disclosure (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Botosan, 1997). Consequently, the annual 
report is used as a proxy for general corporate disclosure (Lapointe-Antunes et al., 
2006; Petersen and Plenborg, 2006). Given the complex nature and comprehensive 
disclosures associated with impairment accounting, the annual report is viewed as 
particularly appropriate medium of analysis for the present study.  
 
 
3.2.3: Data Sources 
 
All available annual reports are published in English and selected for the 12 months 
financial year ended 3
rd
 January 2009 to 1
st
 January 2010. One firm, Bank of Ireland 
Plc, produced two annual reports during 2009, a 12 month report to 31
st
 March 2009 
and a 9 month report to 31
st
 December 2009. The 12 month report is analysed in order 
to ensure equal length of reporting periods across the sample.  
 
The calendar year 2009 is chosen for analysis since reports for this period were the 
latest available which are likely to have undergone impairment testing during the 
period (PwC, 2008). In addition IAASA considers asset impairment to be a key issue 
in the 2009 financial statements given the depth and duration of the recession which 
has become apparent since 2008 (Curtis, 2010). 
 
Industry GICS Class UK Ireland TOTAL 
Energy 5 0 5 
Materials 5 2 7 
Industrials 18 4 22 
Consumer Discretion 29 3 32 
Consumer Staple 5 5 10 
Health 1 1 2 
Financials 11 4 15 
IT 5 1 6 
Utilities 1 0 1 
Total 80 20 100 
 
Table 9: Industry Classification of Sample Firms 





Annual reports for one financial year are under consideration for two reasons. Asset 
impairment tends not to be an annual event for a company; hence consideration of 
more than one year‟s report could raise comparability issues. Secondly, Botosan 
(1997) hypothesises that firms‟ disclosure policies tend to remain constant over time 
which suggests that a cross-sectional study could be sufficient to extrapolate 
disclosure levels beyond one period.  
 
Data for corporate governance, exports and impairment variables are obtained directly 
from the reports. All other explanatory data was obtained from the Thomson One-
Banker database. All monetary amounts are translated into Pound Sterling at the 
exchange rate applicable at each firm‟s financial year end date.    
 
 
3.3 Research Method - Content Analysis 
 
Content analysis is a long-established method used in the social sciences (Beattie et 
al., 2004). The principles of content analysis provide the basis for the first disclosure 
index study by Cooke (1989) whose methodology has proven popular in subsequent 
studies. Summarised by Curuk (2009), this procedure involves (a) the construction of 
a disclosure-scoring sheet, (b) scoring the disclosure items and (c) the creation of a 
disclosure index. 
 
Considerable debate has arisen as to the characteristics of disclosure which are 
investigated by the disclosure index. Cooke and Wallace (1990) consider disclosure to 
be an abstract concept lacking the specifications to be measured directly. 
Consequently, empirical studies have not made a clear distinction whether the 
quantity or quality of disclosure is under analysis (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008). This 
is not surprising since attempts to define disclosure quality have proven nebulous 
(ibid). Several studies use the quantity of disclosure as a proxy for quality on the basis 
that disclosure quantity and quality are positively correlated (Beattie et al., 2004) and 
the absence of disclosure is the most important aspect of stakeholder information 
asymmetry (Marshall and Weetman, 2002). Such an approach is rejected by Marston 
and Shrives (1991) and Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) who favour the use of 
multidimensional frameworks incorporating the views of stakeholders. Given these 
criticisms and the need to devise improved measures of quality (Core, 2001); it is 
prudent to conclude that the present study investigates the quantity and level of 
disclosure following Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008). 
 
 
3.3.1 Construction of the Disclosure-Scoring Sheet 
 
The selection of voluntary disclosure items to be included in the scoring sheet is a 
challenging and potentially subjective process (Raffournier, 1997). In order to ensure 
a rigorous approach, the construction method proposed by Owusu-Ansah (1997) is 
adopted for this study. First, a list of mandatory impairment disclosures under IAS 36 
is prepared followed by a listing of all potential disclosures uncovered through a 
survey of alternative annual reports, in this case, for firms listed on FTSE 100 index. 
A comparison between both lists is made in order to ensure that only voluntary 
disclosures are included on the scoring-sheet. There is no recommended number of 
disclosure items with previous studies showing substantial variability (Curuk, 2009).  






The disclosure-scoring sheet is comprised of 72 disclosure items split into four equal 
sections as follows: 
 
A) Management Discussion Disclosure: including disclosures relating to impairment 
description, amount and prior year comparison in the report highlights, chairman‟s 
report and operating and financial review. 
 
B) Actual Impairment Disclosure: detailed reasons for impairment, recognition on the 
face of the financial statements and management responses are amongst the 
disclosures recorded. 
 
C) Impairment Policy Disclosure: Under this heading, disclosures feature decisions 
relating to impairment reviews, allocation of cash generating units and sensitivity 
analyses amongst others. 
 
D) Impairment Assumptions Disclosure: Finally, the detail of assumptions relating to 
value in use estimates including reasons and comparative figures are recorded here.    
 
An additional section includes five optional disclosures which may be applicable 
depending on the impairment policies of each firm. Thus, the potential maximum 
number of voluntary disclosures is 77. A template of the disclosure scoring sheet is 
attached in appendix A. 
 
Following Cooke (1993), disclosures may be made throughout the entire contents of 
the annual report unless required to appear in a particular section. Express provision is 
made for repeated or similar disclosures for three specific disclosure areas in order to 
adequately reflect the importance attached by the company to impairment disclosure. 
This decision is guided by Krippendorff‟s (2003) assertion that the extent of 
information disclosed is assumed to reflect the relative importance attached to the 
subject.  
 
Points are awarded to firms which discuss impairment across the different sections of 
management discussion in Section A and to firms which provide more than one 
estimate of recoverable amount headroom (Section B) and impairment sensitivities 
(Section C). In other cases of multiple disclosures, the most informative disclosure is 
considered. 
 
For the purposes of this study, a narrow or „boiler-plate‟ disclosure is considered 
adequate for the purposes of mandatory reporting. Following Bartlett and Jones 
(1997), „boiler-plate‟ and less expansive disclosures are treated as mandatory with 
more voluminous disclosures considered to be voluntary where appropriate. Examples 
of narrow and broad disclosures are included in appendix B. 
 
 
3.3.2 Coding and Units of Measurement 
 
Units of measurement and analysis are important considerations in disclosure studies 
since the volume of disclosure is assumed to signify a firm‟s disclosure performance 
(Unerman, 2000). According to Milne and Adler (1999), sentences are most reliable 





unit of analysis since they provide the required context to investigate disclosures 
unlike coding based on individual words. However, Beattie and Thomson (2007) note 
that this approach ignores variations in sentence length and disclosure content within 
each sentence. Alternatively, Beattie et al., (2004) advocate the use of „text units‟ 
which involves splitting sentences into words or phrases containing a single piece of 
information meaningful in its own right. In addition, studies which analyse a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative disclosures suggest that the use of text 
units is the more suitable approach (Botosan, 1997; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007). 
 
Disclosures can also be made through the use of graphics and word emphasis such as 
font size, colour and italicisation (Unerman, 2000). However, following Li et al., 
(2008) and numerous other studies, pictorial disclosures and word emphasises are not 
separately recorded. The coding approach adopted in this study is adapted from the 
three stage process used by Li et al., (2008). First, sentences and tables containing 
relevant disclosures are identified by references to impairment or synonyms such as 
„write-down‟ or „revalue‟. Next, sentences are broken down into component text 
units, disregarding mandatory disclosures or those relating to impairments outside the 
scope of the study. Finally, text units are evaluated and marked on the disclosure 
score-sheet.         
 
 
3.3.3 Scoring the Disclosure Items 
 
The most common approach to scoring disclosure items is to apply an unweighted, 
dichotomous technique, adjusted for non-applicable items (Street and Bryant, 2000; 
Chavent et al., 2006; Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007; Curuk, 2009). Thus, a score of „1‟ 
is allocated to each item that is disclosed, a score „0‟ if not disclosed or NA if not 
applicable (Gul and Leung, 2004). This additive approach to disclosure score 
emphasises consideration of the existence of the disclosure (Ali et al., 2004) and is 




where TD is the total sum of the disclosure scores allocated to each firm 
di is 1 if item i is disclosed, or 0 otherwise, and, 
n is the total number of possible disclosure items (n=77) 
 
This approach has been criticised on the basis that each disclosure item is regarded as 
equally important regardless of form or content (Li et al., 2008). Some studies have 
adopted a weighted approach in an attempt to reflect the relative importance attributed 
to disclosures by the users (Hooks et al., 2002; Ho and Wong, 2001). However, 
unweighted scores techniques are favoured by the vast majority of studies (Ahmed 
and Courtis, 1999; Core, 2001). This is because weighted scores require a subjective 
assessment of weights (Gray et al., 1995; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman, 2003), which 
may not reflect the relative importance of disclosures across varying countries, 
industries, user-groups or time-frames (Elsayed and Hoque, 2010).  
 





Although it is likely that stakeholders rank the importance of disclosures differently 
(Raffournier, 1995), the annual report is produced for a general audience (Chau and 
Gray, 2002) and thus following Cooke (1989), it is assumed that users‟ preferences 
level out on average. In addition, prior studies find no substantive differences between 
the use of weighted and unweighted scores (Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987; Adhikari 
and Tondkar, 1992).  
 
 
3.3.4 Construction of the Disclosure Index 
 
The disclosure index is a ratio of the total disclosure score allocated to a company 
with respect to the maximum disclosure score obtainable (Curuk, 2009). It is usually 
expressed as a percentage (Ali et al., 2004) and adjusted to reflect the difference 
between non-disclosure and non-applicability (Inchausti, 1997). This is to ensure that 
a company is not penalised if a disclosure item is irrelevant to its operations or 
accounting policies (Abraham and Cox, 2007; Holder-Webb and Cohen, 2007).  
 
Although determination of non-applicability is a subjective assessment (Akhtaruddin, 
2005), it is commonplace in disclosure studies (Lopes and Rodrigues, 2007) and 
assessed with reference to the annual report as a whole (Cooke, 1989). Accordingly, 
the maximum possible disclosure is computed as follows; 
 
 
 where MD is the maximum disclosure score applicable to the company 
 di  is the disclosure item, and,  
 m is the maximum number of items applicable to that company (m≤77)   
 




where SCORE is the ratio of total disclosures made to maximum score 
applicable expressed as a percentage (0≤SCORE≤100).    
 
The components and calculation of the disclosure score allocated to each firm is listed 
in appendix C. 
 
 
3.4: The Independent Variables  
 
According to our hypotheses voluntary disclosure is related to a number of variables. 
From prior research it is possible to arrive at proxies for these independent variables. 
Table 10 identifies the various hypotheses along with the proxy used and the previous 
studies that have used similar proxies. It should be noted that in the interests of 











3.5 Validity and Reliability 
 
Researcher-constructed indices of disclosure involve subjective judgment (Botosan, 
1997) and may result in findings which are difficult to replicate (Healy and Palepu, 
2001). Hence, for accurate conclusions to be drawn, an assessment of measurement 
validity (i.e. internal consistency of the instrument as a proxy for the intended 
Hypothesis Variable Proxy 
Expected 
Relationship 
Size Log of Total Assets SIZE 
Lopes & Rodrigues 








Conyon et al (2002),, 
Abraham and Cox (2007) 
Positive 
Sector 
1 = Financial, 0 = 
Other 
SECTOR 
Lopes & Rodrigues 
(2007), Elsayed and 
Hoque (2010) 
Positive 
Profitability Net Margin PROFIT 





 % Impairment/Total 
Assets 
IMPAIR 
Unique in context of 
current study but 





1 = Goodwill 
Impairment, 0 = All 
Other Impairments. 
GWILL 
Unique in context of 
current study but 








Lopes & Rodrigues 





1 = audit committee 
made up of all 
independent NED‟s, 
0 = otherwise 
IAUDIT Bassett et al (2007) Positive 
Corporate Code 
Compliant 
1 = fully compliant, 0 
= not fully compliant 
CCODE Goncharov et al (2006) Positive 
Location of main 
listing 




US Dual Listing 
1= dual listing, 0 = 
no dual listing 
USLIST 
Lopes & Rodrigues 





% Exports/Sales EXPO 




Table 10: Hypotheses, Variables‟ Proxies and Expected Relationship 





concept) and reliability (i.e. robustness of the instrument in repeated trials) is required 
(Weber, 1985).  
 
Cronbach‟s Alpha assesses validity by measuring the degree of inter-correlation 
between the four sections of the disclosure scoring-sheet to determine how well the 
underlying construct is captured (Abraham and Cox, 2007). The alpha coefficient 
ranges from zero to one, with an alpha of above 0.7 indicating an acceptably small 
amount of random measurement error (Gul and Leung, 2004). Cronbach‟s Alpha is 
estimated to be 0.71 in the present study which suggests that the disclosure scoring-
sheet has sufficient validity.     
 
As recommended by Bryman and Bell (2004, p.206), a pilot test of the disclosure 
score-sheet is undertaken in order to assess the reliability of the scoring process. As a 
result of a pilot-test on a random sample of twelve companies, small refinements were 
made to the structure of the score-sheet which improved scoring efficiency and 
presentation. After the scoring process is completed, the companies in the pilot-test 





Measurement complexity is recognised as the major drawback in disclosure research 
(Healy and Palepu, 2001). Content analysis is considered to be inherently subjective 
which raises concerns about comparability between studies (Linsey and Shrives, 
2006). However, researchers recognise that few alternatives to self-constructed 
disclosure indices exist (Elsayed and Hoque, 2010). 
 
This study is restricted to the analysis of voluntary disclosures relating to the 
impairment of long-lived, non-financial assets. Accordingly, mandatory disclosures 
and impairments relating to financial instruments, investment properties, inventories 
and other items not subject to IAS 36 Impairment of Assets are excluded from 
consideration. This study is restricted to the annual reports of one financial period, 
thus neither longitudinal trends nor alternative disclosure media are investigated.  
Future research could consider these alternatives. 
 
 
4: Results  
 
4.1: Descriptive Statistics: Impairment  
 
IAS 36 covers impairments relating to goodwill, intangibles and PPE. Table 11 shows 




Asset Type Goodwill Intangibles PPE 
Full Sample (100) 41 33 72 
    
 
Table11: Instances of Impairment by Asset Type 





PPE is the most common write-down with the frequency of goodwill and intangible 
impairments considerably lower. Table 12 shows large variations in the amount of 
impairment, ranging from £227,000 to over £1.27b. The median impairment of £6m, 
however, is relatively small considering the median total asset valuation stands at over 




The UK and Irish firms had mean impairments of £50m and £34m respectively, 
however, independent sample t-testing shows that this difference is not statistically 
significant (p-value 0.676). The vast majority of firms report impairments solely 
within the Income Statement, with six firms (Bank of Ireland, Irish Life and 
Permanent, FBD Holdings, Marston‟s, Stobart and Savills) also recognising 
impairments in the Statement of Other Comprehensive Income.  
 
 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics: Voluntary Impairment Disclosure 
 
The mean voluntary impairment score using the disclosure index is 26% for the full 




The voluntary disclosure scores range from 2.74% to 52.05% for the full disclosure 
index. The disclosure score variable was tested for normality with both the skewness 
and the Shapiro-Wilk tests indicating that the variable is indeed normal (or in the case 
of Shapiro-Wilk test, the null hypothesis that the data is drawn from a normally 
distributed population cannot be rejected). 
 
 
4.3 Descriptive Statistics: Explanatory Variables 
 
Table 13: Descriptive Statistics for Voluntary Disclosure Score (n=101) 
Disclosure Score Mean SD Min Max 
Full Disclosure Index 25.90% 11.4% 3% 52.% 
Mgmt Discussion 21.96% 15.1% 0% 83% 
Impairment Disclosure 24.64% 16.8% 0% 72% 
Impairment Policy 
Disclosure 26.81% 13.5% 0% 61% 
Impairment Assumption 
Disclosure 28.80% 17.0% 0% 67% 
 * 
Table 12: Descriptive Statistics for Impairment Amount 
Impairment Mean SD Min Max Median 
Full Sample (100) 47.15 151.2 0.227 1272.00 6.00 
      
 
SD = Standard Deviation 
All monetary amounts in GBP £ millions 
 





The twelve hypotheses for regression analysis are evenly split between categorical 
and continuous variables. Table 14 displays the frequencies for each categorical 
variable, showing that a majority of firms have US dual-listings and fully independent 
audit committees. Half of the sample also claims to be fully compliant with the 




Table 15 reports the descriptive statistics for the continuous explanatory variables. 
Interestingly, the mean net margin is negative, indicating that the companies selected 
are finding trading over the period challenging. Firms in the sample also have a 
moderate mean level of leverage, but in some cases the leverage percentage exceeds 
100% due to the use of a balance-sheet rather than market-based measure of equity. It 
is also worth noting that the mean impairment as a percentage of total assets is just 






4.4 Univariate Analysis 
 
OLS simple regressions were estimated to check for univariate relationships between 
the disclosure index and each of the variables indentified, see figure 1. The results are 
shown in table 16.  
 
Variable Measure Mean SD Min Max 
β1: SIZE Log TA  3.12 0.57 1.85 5.26 
β2: LEV % Debt / TBSC 40.57 30.20 0 115.47 
β4: PROFIT Net Margin -2.66 21.05 -100 43.42 
β5: IMPAIR % Impair / TA 1.94 3.68 0.01 19.53 
β7: INEDS % INEDS to Board 52.05 12.14 10.53 83.33 
β12: EXPO % Exports to Sales 48.17 36.39 0 99.9 
 
Table 15: Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Explanatory Variables 
TA = Total Assets    SD = Standard Deviation                 All percentages converted to percentage points (x100) 
TBSC = Total Balance Sheet Capital                                * P-values for Shapiro-Wilk Test of Normality 
Variable Dummy Measure Freq. 1 Freq. 0 
β3: SECTOR 1 = Firm in Financial Sector 15 85 
β6: GWILL 1 = Goodwill Impairment  41 59 
β8: IAUDIT 1 = Audit committee fully independent 87 13 
β9: CCODE 1 = Fully combined code compliant  50 50 
β10: UK 1 = Main listing on FTSE index 80 20 
β11: USLIST 1 = Dual-listing on US stock exchange 56 44 
 
Table 14: Descriptive Statistics for Categorical Explanatory Variables 










These results indicate that there is no difference in voluntary impairment disclosure 
based on size, sector (as defined), profitability, whether the audit committee is fully 
independent, if the firm claims to be fully combined code compliant or if the firm is 
primarily listed in the London or Irish Stock Exchanges. However, the bolded p-
values indicate that leverage, the size of the impairment, goodwill impairment and US 
dual-listing individually have a significant influence on the mean level of disclosure. 




4.5 Univariate Analysis: One-Way ANOVA 
 
One-way ANOVA tests for a difference in the mean level of disclosure across more 
than two groups of categorical variables. ANOVA is used in this study to detect 
whether mean voluntary impairment disclosure differs across nine GICS industry 
classifications, from table 9. The ANOVA test p-value for the samples was 0.394. 





1 β1: SIZE 3.182 0.113 
2 β2: LEVERAGE 0.086 0.022
* 
3 β3: SECTOR -3.457 0.279 
4 β4: PROFIT 0.056 0.302 
5 β5: IMPAIR 1.42 0.000
* 
6 β6: GWILL 6.210 0.007
*
 
7 β7: INEDS 0.046 0.627 
8 β8: IAUDIT -4.191 0.218 
9 β9: CCODE 0.438 0.849 
10 β10: UK -2.169 0.450 
11 
β11: USLIST 4.451 0.052
** 
12 
β12: EXPO 0.024 0.441 
* = significant at 5% level.      ** = significant at 10% level 
SCORE = β0 + βXi + ε 
 
Where 
SCORE is the ratio of total voluntary disclosures made to maximum score 
applicable, expressed as a percentage. 
βXi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ 12, (for each hypothesis, see Table 16). 
β0 is the intercept, ε is the regression error term. 
 
Figure 1:  Simple Regression Equation 





However, since this p-value is below 0.05, the null hypothesis of no difference in 
disclosure across sectors cannot be rejected. 
 
 
4.6 Multiple Regressions 
 
Regression one consists of the full sample of 100 companies and tests all twelve 




The F-stat and associated p-value show that the model has explanatory power. The 
adjusted R-square indicates that 23.8 per cent of the variation in voluntary impairment 
disclosure is explained by the model.  
 
Table 17 shows that all the variables, except corporate code compliance variable, 
display the predicted signs. However, only one variable, the impairment amount, is 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Indeed, the impairment amount was significant 
at the 1% level. This is not an unexpected result; those companies with the larger 
impairments provided the more voluntary information. In addition, profitability and 
the type of impairment (i.e. goodwill) were also significant variables, albeit at the 
10% level of significance. Although leverage and US listing were significantly 
correlated with voluntary impairment disclosure in the univariate analysis, this result 
does not hold for the multiple regression. No significant difference in disclosure is 
found between UK and Irish listed companies, as anticipated.  
 
Regression two considers the six variables from regression one with the largest 
standard coefficients and t-stats. These are firm size, leverage, profitability, 




Both the F-stat and the adjusted R-square figures are higher in regression two, 
increasing from 3.575 to 7.374 and 0.238 to 0.279 respectively (Table 17). This is to 
be expected given the confounding effect of the redundant variables in regression one. 
All variables have a positive relationship with voluntary impairment disclosure and 
there is a reduction in p-values across all six variables in comparison to regression one 
(Table 17). There are two significant variables – profitability and the amount of 
impairment at the 5% level, in addition to goodwill, which is significant at the 10% 




ε = Regression Error Term  
Figure 3: Multiple Regression Two Equation 
 
ε = Regression Error Term  
Figure 2: Multiple Regression One Equation 






The third regression considers the impact of removing the size variable from the 
regression. Since size acts as a proxy for omitted variables its inclusion may be of 




The removal of the size variable results in a small decrease in the adjusted R-square to 
27.5% (Table 17) however, this figure is still higher than the 23.8% equivalent 
obtained in regression one. As seen in Table 17, all explanatory variable coefficients 
match their expected signs and four are significant at the 10% level, with leverage and 
profitability significant at the 5% level and impairment significant at the 1% level. 
The substantial reduction in the leverage variable p-value suggests that a confounding 





The results of regression three suggest that leverage, profitability, and impairment 
amount are positively related to the degree of voluntary impairment disclosure.  
Table 17: Multiple Regression Results 
Coefficient (predicted sign +/-) Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 
β1: SIZE (+) +1.722 (0.473) +2.264 (0.236)
 
 
β2: LEV (+) +0.055 (0.156) +0.056 (0.130) +0.074 (0.030)
* 
β3: SECTOR (+) +0.162 (0.964)   


















β7: INEDS (+) + 0.055 (0.626)   
β8: IAUDIT (+) -0.491 (0.898)   
β9: CCODE (+) -0.218 (0.922)   
β10: UK (none) -2.210 (0.452)   
β11: USLIST (+) +0.221 (0.930)   
β12: EXPORT (+) +0.026 (0.418) +0.039 (0.171) +0.041 (0.142)
 
R Square 0.33 0.322 0.312 
Adj R Square 0.238 0.279 0.275 
F Stat  3.575 (0.000) 7.374 (0.000) 8.526 (0.000) 
    
P-Values in parentheses  
* = significant at the 5% level 
** = significant at the 10% level 
 
ε = Regression Error Term  
Figure 4: Regression Three Equation 








4.7: OLS Assumptions  
 
In order to ensure that Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is the best, linear, 
unbiased estimator of the determinants of voluntary impairment disclosure, the model 
must comply with several assumptions (Field, 2009). The dependent variables were 
tested for the existence of multicollinearity. This was initially suspected as the 
corporate governance variables (compliance with the corporate code, % of non 
executive directors and a fully independent audit committee) may be measuring the 
same phenomenon. The accepted cut off point where multicollinearity becomes a 
serious problem is a pair-wise correlation of 0.80 (Gujarati and Porter, 2008). In only 
one case was the correlation between two of the dependent variables over 0.5; the 
fully independent audit committee variable and the percentage of non-executives on 
the board (correlation coefficient of 0.515).  
 
Although it was below the accepted threshold, regression one was re-run twice each 
time excluding one of the partially correlated variables. In both cases, there was only 
a small change to the overall adjusted R
2
 and no change to the significance of the 
variables. Consequently, it can be concluded that the assumption of no 
multicollinearity among the explanatory variables has not been violated.  
 
 
5.0 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
The challenging economic environment has impacted the valuations placed on 
corporate assets, with one-third of FTSE 250 firms and two-thirds of the top thirty 
ISEQ companies recording impairments for the financial year ended 2009. The 
current downward trend in asset valuation and the complex nature of impairment 
determination is likely to increase the information asymmetries which exist between 
management and shareholders (Reidl, 2004). With write-downs as large as £1.27 
billion observed in this study, shareholders are likely to require significant disclosure 
of the reasons and assumptions behind valuations. While some large write downs 
were noted the median amount was just £6.0m.  
 
The mean voluntary disclosure score of 26% observed in this study suggests that UK 
and Irish firms are providing additional impairment information to stakeholders. 
However, there is considerable variability in this practice with some firms scoring 
over 50% while others provide little above the mandatory requirements. Other 
disclosure studies have reported similar trends, with Abraham and Cox (2007) finding 
a mean score of 19.5% for voluntary share-option disclosure and Eng and Mak (2003) 
reporting 33% as their mean disclosure score. These results follow the conclusion of 




5.1 Determinants of Disclosure 
 





This study examines twelve hypothesised influences on the level of voluntary 
impairment disclosure grouped into structural, performance, governance and 
multinational factors. These factors are analysed in turn in as well as potential 
determinants not explained by the model.  
 
 
5.1.1 Structural Variables (Size, Leverage and Sector) 
 
Factors such as firm size, leverage and market sector are classified as structural 
variables since these characteristics are likely to remain steady over long periods. The 
findings provide some evidence that these hypotheses contribute to the firm‟s 
voluntary impairment disclosure decision. Leverage was found to be positively 
correlated to disclosure at the 5% level in the univariate and multivariate analysis 
(regression three). The positive leverage relationship follows the findings of Bujaki 
and McConomy (2002) in contrast to the UK-based study of Linsley and Shrives 
(2006).  
 
These results support the agency cost and signalling theories of disclosure. As firm 
leverage increases, monitoring costs similarly rise due to strict loan covenants. 
Management are then incentivised to volunteer more disclosures to signal reliability 
and reduce the level of risk-bearer scrutiny. The positive relationship suggests that 
voluntary impairment disclosure acts as an important control mechanism to mitigate 
the risk of agency problems. 
 
Market sector (financial versus non-financial) and firm size provide mixed results. 
Although the direction of the relationship was as hypothesised, there was no evidence 
of the significance of the relationship. As a consequence, the related hypotheses are 
not confirmed (hypothesis one and hypothesis three).  
 
These results are surprising since it is hypothesised that relatively more highly 
regulated financial firms are likely to provide additional disclosure in order to reduce 
monitoring costs. Similarly, the results of the size variable run contrary to many 
empirical studies that found significant positive effects between firm size and 
voluntary disclosure (Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) and Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008), 
for example). The existence of increased litigation costs may explain this absence of a 
significant relationship between market sector (financial firms), firm size and the level 
of voluntary disclosure but no direct evidence of this is presented in the current study.  
 
 
5.1.2 Performance Variables (profitability, impairment amount, goodwill 
impairment) 
 
The three performance variables – profitability, impairment amount and goodwill 
impairment – are found to have a positive relationship with the level of voluntary 
impairment disclosures. The impairment amount is significant at the 1% level (all 
regressions), while profitability is significant at the 5% level (all multivariate 
regressions). The results in relation to goodwill impairment are less convincing, 
significant at the 10% level in the multivariate regressions. The profitability result is 
in agreement with the findings of the UK-based study of Walker and Louvari (2003).  
 





These results provide significant evidence in support of the conclusions of the agency 
costs and signalling theories. Firms with increased impairment amounts are seen as 
disclosing more in order to signal stewardship abilities and reduce monitoring costs. 
Similarly, given the complexity and subjectivity of goodwill impairment (Lapointe-
Antunes et al., 2009), managers are viewed as volunteering disclosure in order to 
reduce the consequences of information asymmetries.   
 
Alternatively, increased disclosure may be provided for the purposes of impression 
management or legitimising managerial decisions. However, the positive relationship 
observed between profitability and voluntary impairment disclosure does not support 
this explanation since less profitable firms with impairment would be expected to 
disclose more to justify their position. Overall, it appears that voluntary disclosures 
are linked to performance for stewardship and agency reasons.   
 
 
5.1.3 Governance Variables (audit committee, independent NED’s, corporate 
code compliance) 
 
The connection between corporate governance and voluntary disclosure is a popular 
strand of disclosure research (Donnelly and Mulcahy, 2008). Accordingly, several 
dimensions of corporate governance are examined, including those directly related 
(e.g. audit committee) and indirectly related (e.g. independent NED‟s) to the financial 
reporting process, following Koh et al., (2007).     
 
As hypothesised, a positive relationship is observed between the corporate code 
compliance variable and the fully independent audit committee variable with the 
extent of voluntary impairment disclosure. However, neither of these relationships is 
statistically significant, consistent with the results of Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) and 
Bassett et al., (2007).    
 
The statistical insignificance of all three governance variables is unexpected given the 
involvement of the board of directors in determining the extent of voluntary 
disclosures (Abraham and Cox, 2007). This may be due to the level of complexity 
involved in the presentation of impairment information compared to general 
disclosures. In addition, tests for multicollinearity between the governance variables 
did not have an impact on the results as reported.  
 
 
5.1.4 Multinational Variables (UK/Ireland, US Dual Listing, Export Sales) 
 
Management‟s decision to provide voluntary disclosures is viewed as being 
influenced by the underlying business and cultural environment in which companies 
operate (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Firms with a larger multinational presence either 
through foreign listings or international sales are hypothesised to volunteer additional 
impairment disclosures. The research findings provide some support for this 
viewpoint. Univariate analysis finds the presence of a US dual-listing positively 
associated with voluntary disclosure at the 10% level of significance, however, no 
significant relationship was found in the multivariate regressions. These results are 
partially consistent with the findings of prior research, including the UK-based studies 
of Abraham and Cox (2007) and Walker and Louvari (2003).     






Firms with US-listings are likely to engage new stakeholders such as foreign 
shareholders, regulators and governments and also be exposed to new financial 
reporting environments and demands for disclosure (Ding, 2002). The findings 
suggest that firms react by increasing voluntary impairment disclosure as a means of 
signalling transparency in order to build trust in their foreign dealings and reduce the 
monitoring costs imposed on the firm by foreign shareholders. International firms‟ 
requirement for increased capital and the potential litigation risks perceived to be 
associated with the US market (Core, 1997) are also potential reasons for the 
association between multinational variables and increased impairment disclosure.  
 
 
5.2 Non-Hypothesised Factors 
 
The three regression analyses provide adjusted R-square figures ranging between 
24%-28%, which suggests that over two-thirds of the determinants of voluntary 
impairment disclosure are not explained by the models. Low R-square figures occur 
frequently in disclosure studies with Abraham and Cox (2007), Eng and Mak (2003) 
and Lopes and Rodrigues (2007) obtaining 0.42, 0.21, and 0.13 adjusted R-squares 
respectively. This suggests that non-hypothesised factors play a substantial role in 
management‟s voluntary disclosure decisions. 
 
Contingency and institutional theories offer explanations for voluntary disclosure 
which are frequently outside the scope of quantitative analysis. Contingency theory 
proposes that the disclosure decision is determined by the specific combination of a 
firm‟s history, culture and managerial preferences (Gibbons et al., 1990).  
 
Verrecchia (2001) notes that there is no one integrated theory that explains the extent 
of voluntary disclosure. Instead, the disclosure decision is likely to consist of a 
combination of related or even competing explanations. For some firms, voluntary 
disclosure may begin with a standardised template which is adapted to signal specific 
agency issues, while being influenced by the disclosure culture unique to the firm. 
Management‟s decision to voluntarily disclose impairment information is a complex 
process, combining agency, financial and strategic factors, while also considering 
behavioural and structural perspectives.   
 
 
5.3: The Broader Debate  
 
Although outside the original scope of this study, our results can add to the ongoing 
wider debate on the reliability of financial statements.  
 
While some large write downs were noted the median amount was just £6.0m. This is 
consistent with similar low levels of write downs noted in another study carried out by 
investment bank Houlihan Lokey (2010). These impairments have already attracted 
some attention in the popular media (Financial Times, 27 September 2010) with the 
influential Lex column being extremely sceptical of the low level of write downs 
given the poor underlying economic conditions. Commentary such as this highlights 
the inherent difficulty in reporting financial information that can be relied upon by 
users under conditions of information asymmetry. 






A possible conclusion that could be arrived at is that companies are providing 
additional voluntary information (as evidenced by the mean voluntary disclosure 
score of 26%) but this is not resulting larger asset write downs (as evidenced by the 
median impairment amount of £6.0 million). This type of behaviour could be 
explained through a legitimacy lens; through voluntary disclosures, firms attempt to 
diffuse societal pressure and establish a legitimate social standing (Deegan and 
Gordan, 1996). Legitimacy theory is more often applied in corporate responsibility 
reporting, however, firms may volunteer impairment information to indicate 
accountability in light of public pressure produced by turbulent economic conditions. 
 
However, the current study does show that the size of the impairment is a significant 
factor in explaining the extent of voluntary disclosures. In all of the tests conducted 
the impairment amount was significant (all at 1% significance). Thus, while 
impairment amounts could be considered to be low, those firms with larger 
impairments disclosed more information. This could be an attempt by these 
companies to reduce agency costs and the effects of information asymmetry. Perhaps 
the criticism of the profession by Lex (Financial Times, 27 September 2010) should 
be reconsidered given our results. 
 
 
5.4 Research Limitations 
 
It should be noted that the findings and conclusions of this analysis are subject to a 
number of limitations. First, this study shares the general limitations associated with 
disclosure studies such as the use of a researcher-constructed disclosure index which 
is recognised as inherently subjective (Linsey and Shrives, 2006).. 
 
This study is restricted to the annual reports of one financial period, thus neither 
longitudinal trends nor alternative disclosure media are investigated. In addition, only 
impairments relating to assets subject to IAS 36 Impairment of Assets (i.e. goodwill, 
intangible assets and PPE) are considered. 
 
 
5.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
The work undertaken in this study can be extended in several directions. First, firms‟ 
voluntary impairment disclosure scores could be analysed in a value-relevance study, 
to investigate whether the extent of voluntary impairment explains movements in 
share prices and returns. Also, the disclosure index constructed for the purposes of 
this dissertation could be used in longitudinal analysis and other international studies.     
 
Future research could consider whether a relationship exists between impairment 
disclosures for goodwill, intangibles and PPE and other impairments not considered 
by IAS 36, such as financial instruments. Additionally, impairment reversals are 
likely to become more prevalent once economic conditions improve and research into 
the extent of voluntary impairment reversal disclosures may make for an interesting 
comparison to this study.     
 





Palmer (2008) notes the frequent use of auditor-prepared templates for technical 
accounting disclosures. A content analysis of templates produced by the Big-Four 
audit firms for impairment disclosures may also provide insights into the extent of 
voluntary impairment disclosure from an institutional viewpoint. Finally, interviews 
with the financial directors and reporting accountants involved in producing 





This study had two research questions: 
 What is the extent of voluntary impairment disclosures in the annual reports of 
UK and Irish companies? 
 What are the factors that influence the level of voluntary impairment 
disclosures made by UK and Irish companies? 
 
We found that while the average impairment size was unexpectedly small (median 
amount of £6.0m, n = 100), a mean voluntary disclosure score of 26% was observed. 
This suggests that UK and Irish firms are providing additional impairment 
information to stakeholders. 
 
We hypothesized that twelve factors could influence the level of voluntary disclosure. 
Our research has shown that the impairment amount, the level of profits, leverage, US 
dual listing and the impairment type were all significant factors in determining the 
level of voluntary disclosure (Table 18). As hypothesized, there was no significant 
difference between the Irish listed and UK listed companies. Finally, no significance 
was found for the variables representing the level of export sales, size, corporate code 
compliance, sector, independent non executive directors and independent audit 
committee. In all cases, for the significant factors, the direction of the relationship was 
positive, as originally hypothesized.  
 







In the recessionary environment of this study, risk bearers face considerable 
uncertainties, especially concerning asset valuations (Curtis, 2010). Although 
accounting standards require considerable disclosures, voluntary information gives 
managers the opportunity to disclosure more meaningful asset specific information, 
which could successfully bridge the information asymmetries of the users of financial 
statements. This study contributes to the substantial body of research on corporate 
disclosures, showing that UK and Irish firms do provide additional impairment 
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Appendix A: Disclosure Index 
 
Voluntary Impairment Disclosure Index     
        
        
A. Management Discussion Disclosure (18 Marks)    
1. Introductory Pages     Score 
 Term 'Impairment' mentioned    1 
 Impairment Amount mentioned    1 
 Description of Impaired Asset     1 
 Reason for Impairment    1 
 Comparison to prior year impairment (if any)  1 
       5 
        
2. Chairman/CEO Statement     
 Term 'Impairment' mentioned    1 
 Impairment Amount mentioned    1 
 Description of Impaired Asset     1 
 Reason for impairment    1 
 Comparison to prior year impairment (if any)  1 
       5 
        
3. Director's Report/OF Review     
 Term 'Impairment' mentioned    1 
 Impairment Amount mentioned    1 
 Reason for Impairment    1 
 Description of Impaired Asset     1 
 Comparison to prior year impairment (if any)  1 
       5 
        
4. Statements on Corporate Governance    
 Impairment mentioned    1 
 Impairment reviewed/approved by Board/Committee                     1 
 Dates of meetings when impairment reviewed/approved                1 
       3 
        
      Subtotal 18 
        
B. Actual Impairment Disclosure (18 marks)    
5. Financial Statements      
 Term 'Impairment' mentioned (jointly) as line-item on I/S              1 
 Term 'Impairment' mentioned singly as line-item on I/S                1 
 Term 'Impairment' mentioned (jointly) as line-item on Cash Flow   1 
 Term 'Impairment' mentioned singly as line-item on Cash Flow     1 
       4 
        
6. Impairment Description     
 Location of Impaired Asset    1 
 Breakdown of Reason - not just "economic conditions"   
  Industry Perspective? e.g. sector downturn 1 
  Firm Perspective?  e.g. restructuring  1 
 Disclosure on any tax/depreciation implications of impairment 1 





       4 
        
7. Headroom       
 Discussion of Headroom    1 
 Example 1: Exact Amount/% of headroom  1 
 Example 2 Exact Amount/% of headroom  1 
 % Headroom of alternative valuation method (ViU/FV) provided 1 
 Prior Year Headroom     1 
       5 
        
8. Other Disclosures      
 Disclosure of comparative information for years prior to 2008        1 
 Management Response to Impairment   1 
 Management statement regarding future impairments   1 
 Firm Specific Information    1 
 Length of Impairment Note - greater than 1 page?  1 
       5 
        
      Subtotal 18 
        
C. Impairment Policy Disclosure (18 marks)    
9. Policy Disclosures      
 Impairment Policy Note - distinct from asset policy note            1 
 Factors considered for an impairment review  1 
 Impairment in Significant Judgements & Assumptions  1 
 Discuss how difficult economic environment affects estimation  1 
 Source of valuation approved by Board/Audit Com 1 
 Source of valuation externally verified/valued 1 
 Total Number of CGUs     1 
 Description of CGUs disclosed- Location/Sector  1 
 Compliance demonstrated with particular IAS 36 paragraph stated 1 
       9 
        
10. Sensitivity Analysis    
 Assumption which is most sensitive to change  1 
        
 For first assumption sensitivity     
 Example of Exact Amount/% change in assumption                    1 
 Exact amount of resulting impairment                     1 
 Assessment of Risk of Change                      1 
 Prior Year Comparison                      1 
        
 For second assumption sensitivity     
 Example of Exact Amount/% change in assumption 1 
 Exact amount of resulting impairment  1 
 Assessment of Risk of Change   1 
 Prior Year Comparison   1 
       9 
        
      Subtotal 18 
        
        





        
        
        
D. Impairment Assumptions Disclosure (18 marks)    
11. Assumptions      
 Number of Assumptions - all listed   1 
 Description on each assumption (provided)   1 
 Indicator of Reliability/Accuracy of assumptions   1 
 Impairment determination requires significant judgment (within note) 1 
       4 
        
12. Discount Rate      
 Exact Figure - not range    1 
 Comparative Prior Exact Figure    1 
 Description: Reason and Source    1 
       3 
        
13. Growth/Perpetuity rate or terminal value estimation   
 Exact Figure - not range    1 
 Comparative Prior Exact Figure    1 
 Description: Reason and Source    1 
       3 
        
14. Firm Specific Assumption     
 Exact Measure - not range    1 
 Comparative Prior Exact Figure    1 
 Description: Reason and Source    1 
       3 
        
15. Inflation Rate      
 Mentions 'inflation influence'    1 
 Exact Figure - not range    1 
 Comparative Prior Exact Figure    1 
       3 
        
16. WACC       
 Exact Figure - not range    1 
 Comparative Prior Exact Figure    1 
       2 
        
      Subtotal 18 
        
  E. Optional (5 marks)      
 Reason for not allocating asset to CGUs   1 
 Explanation if allocation of assets between CGUs has changed           1 
 Justification of projection period greater than 5 years       1 
 If Externally Valued:                     Name of Valuer   1 
   Valuer's Qualifications  1 
        
                         Optional  5 
        
             TOTAL SCORE 77 






Appendix B: Disclosure Examples 
 
This appendix provides examples of how the researcher scored the voluntary 
impairment disclosures for each of the four sections of the disclosure checklist. 
 
Section A: Management Discussion Disclosure 
Disclosure scores in the management discussion section of the annual report are 
allocated across five points as follows: 
1. Term 'Impairment' mentioned 
2. Impairment Amount mentioned 
3. Description of Impaired Asset  
4. Reason for impairment 
5. Comparison to prior year impairment (If any) 
  
The following extract from DSG International Plc‟s Annual Report (p.24) is an 
example of a disclosure which scores full marks across all five points: 
 
           2009     2008 
Business Impairment £126.1m £22.9m 
 
Other business impairments comprise the closure costs 
of the PC City Sweden and Markantalo stores; the 
closure costs of 11 stores and impairment charges in 
PC City Spain in connection with the restructuring of 
this business; the impairment of Polish stores following 
a disappointing performance in this market; and the 
impairment of Currys digital and certain Currys High 
Street stores as the closure programme of those non-
core stores, identified last financial year, is 
implemented. 
 
In contrast, the disclosure from Rentokil Plc.‟s Annual Report (p.16) does not 
distinguish impairment amounts from once-off costs and doesn‟t specify which assets 
are being impaired. Two marks are awarded for mentioning „impairment‟ and 
providing a reason for the impairment: 
 
This year these [once-off costs] have amounted to £37.1 
million (2008: £19.6 million) and represent costs 
associated with the reorganisation of the Textiles and 
Washrooms division (primarily the closure of processing 
plants in Belgium and France), the costs associated with 
the closure and relocation of the London corporate 
office and redundancy costs and impairment of assets 
relating to the continued integration of the City Link 
and Target Express businesses.  





Section B: Actual Impairment Disclosure 
 
Whether impairment is listed on the face of the financial statements or relegated to the 
notes is an important indicator of voluntary impairment disclosure. Four disclosure 
marks are allocated as follows: 
 
1. Impairment mentioned (jointly) as line-item on Income Statement              
2. Impairment mentioned singly as line-item on Income Statement                
3. Impairment mentioned (jointly) as line-item on Cash Flow Statement 
4. Impairment mentioned singly as line-item on Cash Flow Statement    
 
Full marks are allocated to Persimmon Plc. for disclosing „impairment of intangible 
assets £4m‟ on the face of the Income and Cash Flow statements. This compares with 
two marks awarded to BTG Plc. for disclosing „Amortisation and impairment of 
intangible assets £6.2m‟ and not distinguishing between asset amortisation and 
impairment.  
 
In contrast, WH Smith Plc. relegates impairment to the notes and therefore receives 
no marks. Its annual report (p.46) states:  
 
During the period there was a £3m impairment charge 
for property, plant and equipment and other intangible 
assets included in distribution costs. 
 
 
Section C: Impairment Policy Disclosures 
 
Taking the example of sensitivity analysis disclosures, eight marks are assigned 
across two assumptions, as follows: 
 
1.  Stating Exact Amount(%) change in assumption 
2.  Stating Exact Amount of resulting impairment 
3.  Assessment of Risk of Change 
4.  Prior Year Comparison 
   
The following disclosure from Norkom Plc obtains one disclosure mark since an exact 
percentage change in the discount rate is presented, however, no estimate of the 
resultant change in headroom is provided. 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
If the estimated pre-tax discount rate applied to the 
discounted cash flows had been 10% higher than 
management‟s estimates, there would have been no 
requirement on the Group to recognise an impairment 
against goodwill. (Annual Report, p.54) 
 
In contrast, CPL plc. obtains two marks times two assumptions for disclosing both an 
exact change in rates and the resultant increase or decrease in impairment, as seen in 
the following annual report extract (p.45):  
 








An additional disclosure mark is obtained for assessing the likelihood of any 
particular change in assumptions occurring, such as discussed in Euromoney 
Institutional Investor Plc.‟s Annual Report (p.72):   
 
Management believes the general market conditions 
seem to have stabilised and therefore a decrease in 
growth rates to 2% or a WACC of 11.5% would be 
severe. Management will continue to conduct regular 
reviews to monitor this matter. 
 
 
Section D: Impairment Assumptions Disclosure 
 
Disclosures relating to the assumptions behind value in use calculations are 
considered in this section and marks are awarded depending on the detail of the 
assumptions provided. The following disclosure by Fenner Plc. is an example of a 
„boiler-plate‟ statement and yields no marks:  
 
The key assumptions used to determine the value in use 
relate to profits derived from sales volumes, selling 
prices and costs, growth rates and discount rates 
(Annual Report, p.56). 
 
In comparison, marks are awarded to Britvic Plc. for the detail relating to each 









Six marks are allocated to disclosures relating to discount rate and growth rate as 
follows:  
 
    Discount Rate                                                  Growth/Perpetuity Rate 
 1. Exact Figure - not range                                4. Exact Figure - not range 
 2. Comparative Prior Year Exact Figure           5. Comparative Prior Year Exact Figure 
 3. Description: Reason and Source                   6. Description: Reason and Source 
 
Yell Group Plc. achieves full marks as it describes the rationale behind the rates 




Alternatively, Kerry Group Plc, as shown below, provides wide ranges for their rates 
which are not as informative to account users. However, since descriptions explaining 
the rates chosen are disclosed, Kerry Group Plc scores two marks.    
 
 
The discount rate used is between 5% and 10% (2008: 
6% and 10%). A higher discount rate is applied to 
higher risk markets such as South America, while a 
lower rate is applied to more stable markets such as the 
USA. Growth rates are based on forecasts in line with 
assumed long-term industry growth rates ranging from 
2% to 7% (2008: 2% to 10%). Generally, lower growth 
rates are used in mature markets such as Ireland while 
higher growth rates are used in emerging markets such 













Appendix C: Disclosure Scores Allocated to Each Firm 
 A B C D  
 Management Actual Impairment Impairment Total 
 Discussion Impairment Policy Assumption Disclosure 
 Disclosure Disclosure Disclosure Disclosure Score 
      
ISEQ Listed Firms % % % % % 
1. CRH 39 22 33 22 30 
3. Kerry 0 11 33 28 18 
4. Elan 44 44 39 22 38 
5. Bank of Ireland 33 56 22 39 37 
7. DCC 28 17 17 50 27 
8. Smurfit Kappa 28 44 39 33 37 
10. Kingspan 11 6 50 28 24 
11. Paddy Power 0 33 22 67 30 
12. AIB 11 33 28 33 26 
15. Grafton 22 17 28 33 25 
17. IL&P 33 28 28 28 29 
18. INM 22 22 39 61 36 
21. Origin 0 6 28 11 12 
22. Greencore 0 0 28 39 16 
23. FBD 17 44 28 22 43 
25. Norkom 0 22 44 22 22 
27. Total Produce 28 17 56 39 34 
28. Fyffes 22 11 11 17 15 
29. Abbey 17 28 11 0 22 
30. CPL Resources 17 50 44 6 31 
      
FTSE Listed Firms % % % % % 
2. Aberdeen Asset Mgt 28 33 61 44 42 
4. Aegis Group 28 11 17 17 18 
8. Arriva 39 33 17 28 29 
13. BBA Aviation 28 39 28 39 34 
17. BTG 6 22 28 17 19 
20. A.G. Barr 22 33 39 22 29 
21. Balfour Beatty 6 22 17 50 24 
26. Big Yellow Group 22 6 11 0 10 
30. Bodycote International 83 28 28 39 44 
33. Brewin Dolphin 6 17 17 0 10 
37. Britvic 17 44 61 61 47 
41. Caledonia Investments 0 0 11 0 3 
44. Carpetright 22 11 33 33 25 
46. Charter International 28 11 22 39 25 
47. Chemring Group 11 17 28 28 21 
50. Close Brothers Group 50 22 22 17 27 
55. Cranswick 17 11 11 39 19 
58. Daily Mail and General  33 56 50 39 44 
59. Dairy Crest Group 22 39 44 56 40 
60. Dana Petroleum 22 33 39 28 31 
61. Davis Service Group 44 39 17 22 32 
68. Domino Printing  17 22 28 17 21 
69. Domino's Pizza 22 33 11 0 24 
70. Drax Group 17 6 11 0 12 





      
 A B C D  
 Management Actual Impairment Impairment Total 
 Discussion Impairment Policy Assumption Disclosure 
 Disclosure Disclosure Disclosure Disclosure Score 
      
FTSE Listed Firms % % % % % 
71. DSG International 33 50 33 44 40 
83. Euromoney Institutional  33 44 44 28 37 
86. Fenner 0 11 22 22 14 
87. Ferrexpo 6 17 22 39 22 
91. Filtrona 11 11 22 28 18 
94. Forth Ports 39 11 28 33 27 
95. GKN 28 44 28 39 36 
102. Go-Ahead Group 33 6 17 33 22 
103. Grainger 11 39 33 22 27 
105. Greene King 17 33 39 33 30 
107. HMV Group 17 22 33 28 25 
109. Halfords Group 6 0 11 22 10 
112. Hansteen Holdings 0 11 22 17 15 
117. Heritage Oil 28 22 11 0 22 
120. Hochschild Mining 22 39 44 56 40 
121. Homeserve 67 50 28 50 49 
129. Inchcape 17 28 33 28 26 
134. JKX Oil & Gas 28 50 17 44 36 
142. Jardine Lloyd  11 6 22 28 16 
144. Kesa Electricals 44 22 17 28 27 
146. Ladbrokes 17 17 22 28 21 
151. Logica 11 17 44 61 34 
153. Marston's 22 17 28 33 25 
156. Melrose 6 0 6 0 3 
157. Melrose Resources 22 44 50 39 40 
161. Millennium Hotels 33 33 22 11 25 
162. Misys 6 6 11 11 8 
163. Mitchells & Butlers 22 6 22 11 18 
164. Mondi 33 28 22 39 30 
174. Pace 0 6 17 44 16 
175. Paragon Group  22 17 17 28 21 
176. PartyGaming 22 44 44 56 42 
179. Persimmon 28 39 11 11 21 
184. Premier Oil 22 17 0 17 14 
186. Punch Taverns 44 33 39 39 38 
190. Rank Group 17 50 44 61 42 
192. Redrow 17 6 0 0 8 
195. Rentokil Initial 11 22 28 22 21 
202. SIG plc 39 28 11 0 19 
206. Savills 39 39 22 28 32 
212. Smith (DS) 22 44 39 50 39 
220. Stagecoach Group 39 22 33 61 38 
217. Sports Direct 28 22 39 44 33 
222. Stobart Group 17 6 22 17 15 
226. Tate & Lyle 28 17 17 17 19 
227. Taylor Wimpey 22 6 22 0 12 
      






 A B C D  
 Management Actual Impairment Impairment Total 
 Discussion Impairment Policy Assumption Disclosure 
 Disclosure Disclosure Disclosure Disclosure Score 
      
FTSE Listed Firms % % % % % 
231. Tomkins 67 72 44 28 52 
238. Unite Group 17 6 0 0 5 
239. United Business Media 22 44 50 44 40 
242. W H Smith 0 0 17 22 10 
243. Weir Group 11 11 17 56 23 
245. Wetherspoon (J D) 22 0 11 22 14 
246. William Hill 22 44 39 33 34 
248. Wood Group 11 11 11 22 15 
249. Xchanging 0 0 17 22 10 
250. Yell Group 39 72 44 39 49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
